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INTRODUCTION 
The Tennessee Valley Authority takes the same position 
in this case that it has taken in previous litigation c6n-
cerning the Tellico Project. The TVA argues th~t Tellico 
is exempt from the federal legislation cited by the 
Cherokees and further argues that thes~ Indians cannot 
exercise their constitutional rights in Tellico. As it has 
fdr ten years, TVA argues that it is above the law -- that 
the acts of Congriss and the individual protections of the 
United States Constitution do not apply to Tellico. It is 
precisely because of such legal ar~uments that the founding 
fathers drafted the Amendments to the Constitution -- to 
protect the individual citizen from infringement by the 
government.~ It is basic to out system of government that 
no one is above the law, not Even the government itself. 
We point out at the outset that TVA has not even 
addressed the procedural standards for dismissing the suit 
below. Instead, TVA has improperly brought before this 
Court a new issue -- laches -- which was not relied upon 
by the District Court and was not raised in the Cherokee 
Brief. 
In previous litigation this Court has found that the 
National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species 
Act did apply to TVA and to the Tellico Project. Even though 
this Court may be tired of reviewing attacks upon TVA and 
this project, the Cherokees ask this Court to perform its 
duty and again require TVA to comply with the law of this 
land. 
I. THIS APPEAL HAS NOT BEEN MOOTED. 
The TVA argues in its Brief that this controversy has 
now been mooted and this appeal should be dismissed. To 
support its position, TVA relies solely upon statements of 
Appellants in previous motions for injunctive relief. To 
the contrary, the controversy presented by this case has 
not been resolved and several questions remain for determi-
nation by this Court. 
A. STATEMENTS OF APPELLANTS IN MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE 
RELIEF ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE. 
In order for an appeal to become moot, it must be 
established that some intervening event makes it impossible 
for the Court to grant a party any relief. United States v. 
Alaska S. S.: .. Co., 253 U.S. 113 (1920). The TVA suggest 
that the closing of flood gaces removes any further need 
for a ruling by this Court. 
It appears that on November 29, 1979, TVA closed six 
hinged flap~gates over six sluice tunnels running under 
the Dam. These flap-gates are now being held in place only 
by water pressure. Therefore, it is still possible to raise 
these flap-gates and let water from the Little Tennessee 
River run through just as it has for the past four years. 
However, TVA appears to be arguing that because these 
flap-gates have been lowered, there is no longer any time 
to permit the Cherokees any judicial review of their claims. 
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In their Brief, TVA asserts that statements of the Cherokees 
in their motions for injunctions periding appeal establish 
that the matter has been mooted. The affidavit of Robert 
M. Stivers, Jr., attached to this Brief, indicates that the 
Cherokees were factually incorrect in believing the lowering 
of the flap-gates by TVA was an irreversible process. 
Appellants sought a deposition but were denied this 
discovery by the District Court. When seeking an -injunction, 
Appellants were concerned about clear irreparable harm they 
would suffer from flooding and were also concerned about 
mootness. These concerns were partly bas~d upon second-
hand information, which was, without discovery, the only 
information available to Appellants at that time._ In light 
of subseque~t information, these earlier presumptions_ of 
.-. . .... 
Appellants should not now be deem~d conclusive. 
Furthermore, the statements of TVA concerning safety 
factors are of questionable validity. The affidavit of 
Dr. Ernest F. Brater, submitted with this Reply Brief 1 , 
indicates that the affidavit of Robert A. Shelton, submitted 
by TVA to support its opposition to an injunction, does not 
provide factual or scientific support for the conclusions 
drawn by TVA. Dr. Brater points out that the TVA affidavit 
1. Because the Holiday Season coincided with the 
preparation period for this Reply Brief, the affidavit of 
Dr. -Ernest F. Brater was not available for inclusion with 
this Brief. However, copies of this affidavit are being 
simultaneously mailed to the Court and Counsel. 
3 
'. 
is filled with generalizations and not always clear in 
making its point. The Shelton affidavit is primarily a 
self-serving statement by an employee of TVA without 
supporting data. The question of "safety" is.a relative 
matter which is not adequately discussed in the affidavit. 
It should be noted that the TVA itself pointed out in its 
December, 1978, Report entitled "Alternatives for Completing 
the Tellico Project," that the Tellico Dam cannot be expected 
to withstand a 11 probable maximum flood.u 
The Tellico Dam was designed on the assumption that 
during a very severe flood, half the flow of the 
Little Tennessee would pass through the Fort Loudoun 
spillway. Refinement in techniques for calculating 
these severe floods indicate that the maximum design 
flood is slightly larger than the maximum flood that 
can be contained by the Tellico Dam as originally 
designated with the canal open for joint operation 
with Fort Loudoun. The Department of the Interior's 
Bureau &f Reclamaticn has reviewed the project and 
agrees with this conclusion. [Report, p. 13.] 
The conclusion that the Dam can only be maintained 
safely by immediate completion of Tellico is questionable 
under the circumstances. The Tellico Dam has been in place 
with the flood gates open for the past four years without 
a canal open to Fort Loudoun Lake. The TVA has sat silently 
for these four years while the Little Tennessee River flowed 
through the Dam, raising no hue and cry for public safety. 
It is also significiant that TVA has not, even in the 
Shelton affidavit, stated that there is a real and present 
danger of waters so filling other dams that the pressure on 
4 
Tellico would be unbearable. The affidavit of Shelton 
is a conclusory, generalized statement void of data, sub-
mitted as self-serving to support TVArs action to flood 
the Tellico Project in December; 1979. 
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B. THE CHEROKEES ARE ENTITLED TO OBTAIN DECLARATORY RELIEF. 
It is also clear that while a case may be rendered moot 
by subsequent events as to a request for injunctive relief, 
it need not also be rendered moot as to declaratory relief. 
The test for whether a request for declaratory relief is 
moot is: 
[W]hether the facts allegedi under all circumstancess 
show that there is substantial controversy, between 
the parties having adverse legal interest, of sufficient 
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a 
declaratory judgment. Preiser v. Nerokirk, 422 U.S. 
395, 402 (1975), citing Maryland Casulaty Co. v. Pacific 
Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). 
The question thus becomes to determine whether there 
remains substantial legal questions to be answered between the 
parties. In Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 
115 (1974), $he Court held that the termination of a strike 
rendered moot the workers claim for injunctive relief against 
state officials. However, the Court ruled that federal courts 
have a duty to decide the appropriateness and merits of 
declaratory relief, irrespective of ruling as to the propriety 
of injunctive relief. 
In Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004, 1010 (S.D.W.Va. 
1 9 4 8 ) , and B o hl e r v .. Lane , 2 0 4 F . S up p . 1 6 8 , 1 7 3- 1 7 4 ( S . D . F 1 a . 
1962) the Courts denied injunctive relief but refused to find 
requests for declaratory relief as moot. Significantly, both 
of these cases questioned Plaintiff's right to use public 
6 
proper~y [a swimming pool and a park] with the Courts 
recognizing the individual "rights" even though these 
Plaintiffs had no property interest in the land in question. 
As the Court pointed out in Sigma Chi Fraternity v. 
Reagents of University of Colorado, 258 F. Supp. 515 (D.C. 
Col., 1966), in suits seeking declaratory relief "there is 
a tendency to construe the mootness doctrine more narro\v:ly." 
See also, Porter v. Lee, 328 U.S. 246 (1946); Lehigh Coal 
and Nav. Co. v. Central R. of N.J., 33 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. 
Pa., 1940). Furthermore, in injunctive actions, the fact 
that the action complained of has been completed does not 
necessarily render the issue moot. See Gray v. Sanders, 
372 U.S. 368 (1963); Woods v. Wright; 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir., 
1964). 
In the present case, the Cherokees sought declaratory 
relief with respect to their religious freedoms guaranteed 
by the First Amendment and the American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act. [See paragraph 29 of Complaint; paragraph 3 
in Prayer for Relief.] The Cherokees also sought an order 
directing TVA to return the bodies, remains and burial 
possessions to their resting places with proper dignity and 
reverence. [See paragraph 28 of Complaint.] The TVA argues 
that their "promise" to carry out this last action moots 
the issue. However, in light of TVA's past actions, they 
must sustain a "heavy burden" to show that relief is not 
warranted. See, Weinberger v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975). 
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j. 
Thus, in spite of the denial of injunctive relief, 
these Cherokees still seek a declaration that their First 
Amendment rights have been violated. There remains a "live" 
controversy with respect to the disposition of the bodies 
removed and not yet reinterred. Even though the dam has 
been closed, these claims present a sufficient case or 
controversy for the Court to entertain this appeal. See, 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). There also 
remains an unsettled dispute over whether TVA is entitled 
to retain possession ·of the bodies and remains removed 
from the Cherokee Village sites. The Cherokees sought 
injunctive relief for the return of these bodies [See, 
paragraph 3, Prayet for Relief] and sought a declaration 
that TVA has not complied with the Tennessee Grave Statute 
and that TVA's removal of these graves, in contrast to the 
treatment of non-Indian graves, is discriminatory. The 
District Court completely ignored the issue of these 
graves; consequently, these questions are still very much 
alive. At the same time, none of the Cherokee claims are 
completely mooted, because the Court may order the reopening 
of the dam upon finding the rights of these Plaintiffs have 
been violated. 
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C. DECLARATORY RELIEF IS JUSTIFIED IN THIS CASE BECAUSE 
OF PUBLIC INTEREST. 
Furthermore, the Cherokee request for declaratory relief 
is not mooted because there are important questions of 
"public interest" to be ans\vered. The great weight of 
authority holds that an appellate court may retain an appeal 
for hearing and determination if it involves questions of 
"public interest," even though it has become moot so far 
as the parties to the action are concerned. See, Annotation -
Public Interest as ground for refusal to dismiss an appeal, 
132 ALR 1185. 
The "public interest" in the present suit can hardly 
be questioned in light of previous litigation, congressional 
hearings, and the expenditure of public funds. The heart of 
the present suit is the question - not properly addressed 
by the District Court - whether the phrase "or any other 
law" repealed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, the 
National Historic Preservation Act, and the Tennessee Grave 
Statute. The thrust of the Cherokee claim is to question 
whether Congress can repeal substantive legislation and 
alter its considered policy in all areas through the mere 
insertion of this general and all-inclusive phrase in an 
appropriations act. 
Both TVA and the District Court conclude that the phrase 
in the appropriations act "notwithstanding i~ i~ ~~ any other 
law" is an irrefutable statement of Congressional intent to 
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repeal the American Indian Religious Freedom Act and the 
National Historic Preservation Act. Neither the District 
Court nor TVA cite to a case with such holding. As we 
discussed in our Brief [See pp.21-26] this question was 
not addressed by the District Court. 
Moreover, the legislative history of this appropria-
tions act is very clear. Congress intended to exempt this 
project from the restrictions placed on it by the Endangered 
Species Act and the resulting permanent injunction entered 
by this Court. 
simply stated: 
Under these circumstances the law can be 
When Congress intends to exempt a project 
or program from a particular law, it grants a specific and 
explicit exemption. Congress did so for this project with 
the Endangered Species Act, and only that act has been 
repealed foi purposes of the Tellico Project. 
This view was supported by the Supreme Court in TVA v. 
B~ll, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), and in another Indian case, 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). In Morton the 
question was whether the Indian employment preference 
established by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 was 
repealed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. 
The Court relied upon the "Cardinal rule" that repeals by 
implication are not favored and concluded that Congress 
Still rendered to support the Indian preference policy. 
1o 
Since passage of the Water Appropriations Act and since 
the filing of this suit, Congress has ieaffirmed its vital 
concern with Indian historical, cultural, and religious 
resources. On October 31, 1979, Congress enacted the 
Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, P.L. 96-95> 
93 Stat. 721, 16 U.S.C. 470aa. 
The purpose of this new act is to "secure, for the 
present and future benefit of the American people, the pro-
tection of archaeological resources and sites which are on 
.public lands and Indian lands." The act defines archaeo-
logical resources as "any material remains of past human 
life or activities" and provides procedural safeguards for 
excavation and removal from federal lands and Indian lands. 
The act requjres the Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, 
and Defense, together with the .Chairman of the Boerd of TVA, 
after consultation with Indian Tribes, to establish regula-
tions to carry out the act. Such regulations "may be 
promulgated only after consideration of the provisions of 
the American Indian Religious Freedom Act." [Emphasis 
added.] 
It would seem clear then, that Congress still considers 
the American Indian Religious Freedom Act a matter of vital 
publ~c policy. For the TVA to ask this Court to ignore 
these "fundamental principles" is offensive to our 
Constitution and a matter of great public interest. 
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II. THE DEFENSE OF LACHES DOES NOT WARRANT DISMISSAL OF 
THIS SUIT. 
In its Brief, the TVA relied heavily on the doctrine 
of laches as a ground to affirm the dismissal of this case 
by the District Court. However) the defense of laches is 
not at issue in this appeal because it did not form any 
basis for the decision of the District Court. Even though 
this question is not properly before this Court, the 
Appellants will address this question to show its lack of 
applicability. 
The TVA justifies the dismissal of the suit on the 
basis of laches and indicates that the District Court did 
not rely on this doctrine merely because it "found it un-
necessary." [TVA Brief, p.16.] However) the record below 
indicates quite the opposite. At oral argument and in 
their Trial Brief, the Cherokees argued that laches was 
not a ground for dismissal because it requires factual 
findings before application. The District Court recognized 
this at oral argument. 
BRIDGERS: Now, we would submit that the very defense 
of laches is a factual matter. The argument with . 
respect to TVA raising the question of when should 
the Cherokees have become involved in this, some of 
those considerations are factual considerations. 
COURT: If the case should be decided on that point, 
I think you have a point. I think we would probably 
have to have evidence before I could decide it on 
that point. [Transcript, p. 58.] 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
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COURT: I have indicated I think you may be right 
on that point. And if I have to decide the lawsuit 
on laches I would probably have to hear proof. I 
think - that is my inclination right now, without 
holding anything, that you are right on that point. 
[Transcript, p. 61.] 
The TVA failed to establish that the Cherokees ar~ 
guilty of laches. Because TVA has raised this legal theory 
as a defense, it is proper to define the term. The 
definition itself reveals that this defense is not applicable 
to the present ~ase under Rule 12(b)(6). 
Laches is a neglect or failure on the part of a 
party in the assertion of a right, continuing 
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of 
time, under circumstances permitting diligence, 
resulting in disadvantage to the other party. 
Rank v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 1 (D. C. Ca., 
1956). [Emphasis added.] 
The TVA has never proffered any evidence, in affidavit 
or pLeading ~brm, that TVA has been disadvantaged or suffered 
damage as a result of a delay by the Cherokees in instituting 
the present suit. The TVA has simply not satisified the 
necessary elements in this estoppel-typ~ defense. 
An estoppel arises when one party by concealment 
or false representation intentionally deceives 
another party as to the true statement of facts 
to the detriment of the second party. Four 
elements are necessary: (1) the party to be 
estopped must know the facts; (2) He must intend 
that his conduct shall be acted on or must so 
act that the party asserting the estoppel has 
a right to believe it is so intended; (3) The 
latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and 
(4) He must ~ely on the former's conduct to his 
injury. California State Board of Equalization 
v. Coast Radio Products, 228 F.2d 520 at 525. 
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The TVA failed to show that these standa~ds are met 
in the present case. Further more, even if TVA had proverly 
alleged these elements, it would have accomplished no more 
than to show that a clear-cut factual controversy existed, 
which would require an evidentiary hearing for resolution. 
Deciding against the Cherokees on a Motion to Dismiss, 
where all factual questions must be resolved in favor of 
the Cherokees, is clearly not justified under the theory 
of laches. 
The cases cited by TVA dealing with laches all are 
cases which required factual findings before the doctrine 
could be applied. These cases can not be controlling 
here, where no evidence was entertained by the District. 
Court. Even though affidavits were submitted by both 
sides, the decision of the District Court was rendered 
under the provisions of Rule 12(b)(6), which is a decision 
based on ~nly the pleadings and their legal adequacy. 
It is furthermore difficult to understand how the 
doctrine of laches can be applied to the present suit which 
attacks a specific statute. The Energy and Water Develop-
ment Appropriations Act of 1980 was signed by President 
Carter on September 25, 1979. On October 12~ 1979~ the 
Cherokees filed suit, attacking the constitutionality of 
Tellico portion of the Act. Thus, the Cherokees filed 
suit attacking the validity of the statute only seventeen 
days after the legislation was enacted. We know of no case 
that would rule waiting seventeen days to attack the 
constitutionality of a statute is laches. 
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III. A PROPERTY INTEREST IN FEDERAL LAND IS NOT A PRE-
REQUISITE FOR STATING A FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM. 
Both the District Court and TVA justify dismissal of 
the Cherokee suit by the lack of a property interest in 
the Tellico lands by the Cherokees. This reasoning misses 
the mark. No individual or group has a property inte.rest 
in land owned by the TVA or in land owned by other branches 
of the federal government. But the lack of such property 
interest has never before been construed as an absolute 
bar to the assertion of a constitutional right. All the 
parties who brought the previous suits challenging the 
Tellico Project under the National Environmental Policy 
Act and the Endangered Species Act did not have a property 
interest in the Tellico lands, but the Courts required 
TVA to comply with the provisions of those statutes. The 
District Court has errected a more stringent requirement 
for a constitutional claim than is required for statutory 
claims. 
The issue of property ownership is actually no more 
than a standing question, although neither TVA nor the 
District Court denominated it as such. For ~easons set 
forth in detail in our Brief [See pp. 18-20] we submit that 
this is a phantom issue. No appellate court has heretofore 
established such a barrier for the pleading of a constitutional 
15 
claim. Indeed, if the standard applied by the District 
CDurt is upheld, this would constitute an impenetrable 
barrier which would effectively deny anyone the possibility 
of exercising First Amendment rights on government owried 
property. 
The TVA and the District Court would have this Court 
believe the First Amendment reads: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof, except on government owned property. 
This is not the law and is an affront to the most funda-
mental legal principles of this country and its government. 
The cases cited by TVA in its Brief [See pp.11-12] 
are inapposite to the First Amendment religious freedom 
issues presented by the· Cherokees. The cas~s cited by TVA 
% 
all involve the First Amendment freedom of expression on 
public property and deal primarily with tre~pass statutes. 
,The only case cited by TVA which involves religious freedom 
is United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir., 
1972). Even in that case the religious issue is peripheral 
to the free speech issues. Furthermore, Crowthers shows 
that government owned property is not vested with the 
restricted power that TVA portrays, because in that case 
the federal_gov~rnment was shown to be under constitutional 
constraint in the operation of the Pentagon. 
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The TVA also argues that the gavernmen~ itself has 
"rights". to the use of its property, citing Kleppe v.:. New 
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) and Light v. United Sta~es, 
220 u.s. 523 (1911). The TVA equates First and Fifth 
Amendment "rights" of the Cherokee Plaintiffs with the 
property interest of TVA. These two cases do not support 
any such proposition. Both cases deal with the Property 
Clause of the Constitution and the power of Congress and 
federal agencies to regulate conduct on federaL lands. 
The cases do not turn on constitutional questions, but on 
the regulatory power of Congress. 
The language of TVA indicates it is asserting constitu-
tional rights of its own on the Tellico lands. However, 
the TVA being a government agency, has no .constitutional 
"rights.n The only persons in this suit who have. constitu-
tianal "rights" are the Plaintiff Cherokees. Therefore, 
on page 14 of the TVA Brief, discussing the "compelling· 
state interest test," it should be understood that the 
constitutional "rights" of these Cherokees would be balanced 
against the governmental rrinterest" of TVA. Such imprecise 
use of language again reveals TVA's disregard for and 
misunderstanding of the constitutional questions presented 
by this case. 
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IV. THE RELIANCE OF TVA ON THE "MINORITY" STATUS OF THE 
PLAINTIFF CHEROKEES IS MISPLACED .. 
The TVA repeatedly emphasizes to the Court that the 
Cherokees who brought this suit are merely a "minority" 
of Cherokees. The clear implication is that a constitutional 
privilege may depend upon the number of persons who invoke 
it. This is an incredulous constitutional argument. 
This kind of faulty reasoning was pointed out by Mr. Justice 
Harlan in his dissent in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963). That case involved the.right of a member of a 
minority religious sect to draw unemployment benefits 
while refusing to work on Saturdays because of her religious 
belief. In pointing out the danger of numerical considera-
tions, Justice Harlan observed: 
[S]urely this disclaimer cannot be taken serious, 
for the Court cannot m(an that the case would 
have come out differently if none of the Seventh-
day Adventists in Spartenburg had been gainfully 
employed, or if the appellant's religion has 
prevented her from working on Tuesdays instead of 
Saturdays. 374 U.S. at 420-421, N. 2. 
A constitutional right is not conditioned upon the 
number of persons who claim it. Nor are the Courts equipped 
to judge what number of persons objecting to a given law, 
upon religious grounds, would be sufficient to tip the 
balance. The protections provided in the various amendments 
to the Constitution were designed to protect individualg 
from interference of their freedoms by the government. 
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The TVA's continued reference to the Cherokees as a 
"minority" is a constitutional affront and indicates its 
lack of preception of the very purpose of the constitutional 
freedoms sought to be protected by this suit. 
Furthermore, it is legally insignificant that any 
other group of ·cherokees is not a party to this suit. The 
Eastern Band and the Ketooah Band of Cherokees both allege 
they represent "traditional" Cherokees. The Cherokee: Nation, 
on the other hand, does not purport to represent "traditional" 
Cherokees and has, in fact, recently filed suit against the 
Ketooah Band contesting the status of the Band and allocation 
of federal funds. The two Plaintiff Indian bands; who 
themselves represent some fifteen thousand (15,000) Cherokees, 
together with the individual Indian Plaintiffs, are entitled 
to constitutional protection from arbitrary action as well 
as other individuals and minorities. Hall v. St. Helena 
Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649, aff'd, 368 U.S. 515 
~1962); Teterud v. Burns, 552 F.2d 357, 360 (8th Cir., 1975). 
An individual has the right to complain of a constitutional 
violation even if other potential class members acquiesce 
to the infringement of the right in question. Law v. Mayor 
~nd City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 346 (D.C.Md. 
1948). 
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Emphasizing the "minority" status of these Cherokees 
reveals the extent to which TVA and the District Court 
failed to understand the claims presented. Neither-TVA 
nor the District Court have acknowledged that the violation 
of an individual's religion may work an exceptional harm 
on them. But our government long ago agreed that these 
religious freedoms would not be denied its ciiizens. 
Most Indian people only became citizens of this 
country in 1924, Act of June 2, 1924, 43 Stat. 253, 8 U.S.C. 
3, and it was only in 1978 that Congress acknowledged that 
the First Amendment protections applied to Indian people 
and their native, traditional religions. American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act, P.L. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469, 42 U.S.C. 
1996. It is not surprising that TVA and the District Court 
have been insensitive to the constitutional claims of 
these Indians, but it is legal error nonetheless. 
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V. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT CONSIDER THE CHEROKEE CLAIMS 
.WITH THE LIBERALITY GENERALLY AFFORDED INDIAN MATTERS. 
The United States maintains a unique r~lationship with 
American ~ndians. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) 
During the past one hundred and fifty years the courts have 
recognized this relationship and the perculiar dependency 
of the Indian people upon the federal government. Because 
of thi~ relationship, the Courts have established rules of 
construction to protect these aboriginal people. In con-
struing treaties and statutes, the courts have established 
a rule that any doubts and ambiguities shall be resolved 
in favor of the Indians. Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United 
States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918). The co~rts recently applied 
this same rationale in halting construction of a dam on 
the Umatilla Indian Reser~ation, ruling that Ind1an treaty 
rights could not be interferred with by a general authori-
zation for construction of a dam. Confeder~ted Tribes v. 
Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553, 555 (1977). This same policy 
calls for specific, and not general, repeal of the Indian 
rights provided for in the American Indian Religious Freedom 
Act. 
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VI. REPLY TO TVA 1 S OPPOSITION TO INJUNCTION. 
In a separate memorandum and in their Brief proper, 
TVA opposes the Cherokee request to have the 1~140 bodies 
reburied at the Tellico site. The TVA justifies this 
position by ·citing cases dealing with eminent domain. The 
TVA claims an unfettered legal right to condemn burial 
grounds and nsacred places" and to exercise "[d]isinterment 
and reburial at other location[s]. 11 
However, the actions of TVA in this case are signifi~ 
cantly different from the situations presented in the cases 
on which TVA relies. First, TVA has pot yet reburied the 
bodies and remains which it has removed from graves. 
Second, the Indian bodies and remains are the only bodies 
which the TVA has refused to rebury in a timely and decent 
mann e r . T hi r d , :he TV A h a s i g no r e d and r e f us e d to h on o r 
the expressed wi3hes of the Plairitiff Cherokees with respect 
to the reburial of these 1,140 remains. Fourth, although 
these bodies and remains have remained unreinterred for 
several years, TVA does not intend 
prior to June 30, 1981. 
to rebury these remains 
Clearly, all of the cases cited by TVA concerning 
eminent domain and removal of bodies from graves constitute 
cases where it is presumed that bodies will be relocated in 
a comparable setting. But in this case~ more than a 
thousand bodies have been removed from their burial places 
only to be placed in sacks and boxes in ihe basement of a 
university museum. Certainly none of the cases cited by 
TVA, nor any state or federal statute, gives TVA the legal 
authority to appropriate these bodies and refuse to comply 
with either state laws or accepted standards of human 
decency. 
The TVA attempts to justify its actions by pointing 
out that the Tennessee Grave Statute would not apply to 
the Cherokee bodies and remains because these were "unmarked" 
graves. However, it {s obvious that TVA knew, or should 
have kno,·rn, of the actual existence of these' graves scattered 
throughout these Indian village sites. The reasons for 
the "marked graves" language in the Tennessee act is obvious. 
The law does not hold persons and governmental agencies to 
the same sb.andard when they are without reasonable notice uf 
the existence of graves. However, in this case, TVA has hdd 
actual knowledge of the existence of these Indian villages 
and the presence of a large number of graves for many 
years. This knowledge is established by the actual 
disinterment of over one thousand graves. 
The clear implication of the TVA argument is that it 
deems itself the owner of these remains. The TVA refuses 
to honor requests of the Cherokees, refuses to comply with 
the provisions of the Tennessee Grave Statute, and refuses 
to honor the terms or provisions of the American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act. [See attachments to Appellant's 
Brief in Support of Mo.tion for Injunction.] 
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Furthermore, the supporting documentation submitted 
by TVA to this Court is misleading and frequently incompetent. 
The TVA attached to its memorandum a document referred to 
as "Attachment A.rr Th~s document ii nothing more than a 
self-serving interpretation and presentation of alleged 
facts, intended to be accepted by the Court as evidence. 
However, this "attachment'' \vas undated, not identified as 
to authorship, unsigned, unverified, and extraneous to the 
record below. Such a document is completely improper and 
incompetent as evidence and we ask the Court to ignore 
this document in its entirety. 
The TVA also argues that a 1974 l~tter written by 
Chief John A. Crowe proves the Eastern Band of Cherokees 
approved the reburial program proposed by TVA. This is 
incorrect. The TVA has taken this letter out of context 
and misconstrued its contents in order to justify its 
actions. For the true intent and purpose of the 1974 
letter, see letter from Chief John A. Crowe to Mr. David 
Freeman, dated November 19, 1979, marked as Exhibit "D" 
and attached to Appellant's Memorandum Support5ng Motion 
for Injunction Pending Appeal previously filed with this 
Court. 
Furthermore, TVA has submitted a copy of an affidavit 
signed by Mr. Ross Swimmer, asserting that this affidavit 
refutes the religious claims of the Plaintiff Cherokees 
and shows approval of the "reburial" plans of TVA. However, 
this affidavit is incompetent for all the avowed purposes 
of TVA. Nowh~re in the affidavit does Mr. Swimmer claim 
to be an expert in matters concerning the Cherokee religion 
or Cherokee culture. Nowhere in the affidavit does Mr. 
Swimmer claim to be a "traditional" Cherokee. Iri fact, Mr. 
Swimmer does not even speak the Cherokee language. The 
only area of expertise claimed by Mr. Swimmer in his affidavit 
is that he is a banker, lawyer, and Indian chief. 
The affidavit is furthermore no evidence of the consent 
of the Plaintiff Cherokees to any "reburial" and since the 
Cherokee "Nation" is not a party, this affidavit is improper 
and incompetent and should be ignored by this Court. 
Because TVA is not the nowner" of the remains of theE'e 
Cherokee ancestors, the Cherokees ask this Court to order 
TVA to comply with the rules of law and public morality, 
and to return these bodies to their proper resting places 
at the earliest possible date and with proper respect and 
religious ceremonies. 
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CONCLUSION 
Both TVA and the District Court have viewed this case 
from the wrong end of their constitutional telescopes. 
The Court found government property interests to prevail 
over the constitutional and statutory rights of these 
Indians as a matter of presumption, without balancing 
these competing interests. The District Court has 
sacrificed one of this country's most fundamental consti-
tutional principles. The District Court was more concerned 
with ratifying the expenditure of public funds than with 
the exercise of religious freedom. We know of no other 
case where these freedoms have been so clearly waived or 
where a Court has, in effect, put a price on constitutional 
ri~hts. 
Contrary to the contention of TVA, this case does not 
inhibit the future ability of the federal government to 
acquire land for government projects. The Cherokees merely 
ask the Court to determine whether the action taken in this 
project is constitutionally valid when it clearly interfers 
with religious practices of Cherokee Indians. There can 
be no doubt that an act of Congress may not violate rights 
protected by the Cofistitution and that the Courts have 
authority to determine the invalidity of such acts. 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). 
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Marbury 
For these reasons, the Cherokees ask this Court to 
reverse the rulings of the District Court. 
R e s p e c t f u 11 y sub m i t t e d , t hi s t h e Jfll) d a y o f J an u a r y , 
1980. 
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APPENDIX 
AFFIDAVIT 
Comes, Robert H. Stivers, Jr. , being first duly sworn,. and for 
his Affidavit says: 
L 
'Ihat the affiant is one of the attorneys of record for the · 
plaintiff-appellants in the m::ttter of Amrroneta Sequoyah vs. Termessee Valley 
Authority, said matter presently being on appeal to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and does make this Affidavit in response to 
certain allegations raised by D."le defendant with regard to the rrootness of 
the legal issues involved in that appeal. 
The affiant would state that he has served as the primary source 
for information among counsels for the plaintiffs regarding the practical 
affect of the ~,closure of the gates in the Tellico Darn, so as to begin the 
flooding of the Tellico Reservior. 
II. 
That, prior to the filing of the lawsuit, during the pendency of 
tl1e lawsuit in the District Court, and during the time of the filing of 
Motions for Injunctive Relief pending appeal, the affiant had received in-
forrnation from sources boD."l within, and without, the Tennessee Valley Authority 
that once the gates on the dam were closed, they could not be reopened without 
serious physical damage to the dam itself, because~ 
l. Immediately after closure, concrete would be poured do.vn through the top 
of each of the gates in question, filling the gates witl1 .both concrete and 
sand, rendering a massive concrete structure where water had once flowed; and 
2. That the spill gates thenlSel ves would be physically locked in place with 
additional mechanisms which could not be subsequently removed. 
Based on tl1e information available to tl1e plaintiffs, H1e only 
alternative for reopening the Da:J., so as to drain tl1e water, and allow the 
Court to render the property decision which would be forceable, involved 
exploding some or all of the D2~rn. in question, ~,.,il:J.ich, franldy, would certainly 
border on mootness. 
III. 
l'>..fter Ll-J.e closure of the Dam on Noverrber 29, 1979, specificq.lly 
during the first week in Decerrber of 1979, the affiant received information 
from a reliable so~rrce that a construction executive witi1 H1e defendant 
T.V.l\., highly placed specifically on the Tellico Project, stated that: the 
opening of the gates in question could be accomplished without structural 
damage to the Dam itself, and advised: 
1. 'Ihe concrete in question would be simply placed in the gates from tunnels 
within the Darn, putting concrete in the botb An of the gate only, and H1at this 
concrete could be rerroved manually' after us i_ng small charges of dynamite 
to break up the concrete itself; and 
2. That the gates in question could then be lifted vvi th a crane, alloHing the 
water to be renDved from L~e reservior on a schedule basis. 
Under the information received after injunctive relief had been 
denied in the .initial stages, and after the Brief of the plaintiffs-appellants 
had been filed, it does appear that H1e water may be rerroved from the 
reservior, upon orders of the Court 1 without the destruction of the Dam in 
question/ and possible inherent dangers tJ1erein. 
1i\TI'I'NESS my hand this 21st day of December, 1979. 
S'I'A'l'E OF rl'ENNESSEE 
C01J1'J'lY OF KNOX 
I, the undersigned authority, a Notary Pul:llic in and for said 
State and County, do hereby certify that Robert Ivl. S-tivers, Jr., to me 
personally knovm., executed the foregoing doc1.:rrnent for the purp:Jses contained 
therein, and stated that the facts contained therein are true c:mc1 correct to 
the best of his knovvledge, information, and belief. 
l'VITNESS my hand and seal at office this 21st day of Decerriber, 1979. 
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